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Reprinted with permission, courtesy of The Cy Twombly Archive.
“The materia prima [raw material] is what exists prior to the division operated by 
meaning: an enormous paradox since nothing, in the human order, comes to man unless 
it is immediately accompanied by a meaning, the meaning which other men have given 
it, and so on, in an infinite regress. The demiurgic power of the painter is in this, that 
he makes the materials exist as matter; even if some meaning comes out of the painting, 
pencil and colour remain as “things”, as stubborn substances whose obstinacy in 
“being there” nothing (no subsequent meaning) can destroy.” 
Roland Barthes, The Wisdom of Art*
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Abstract: Difference, not identity, is the primary quality of language. This difference is 
initially argued to be an “[un]common sense;” one which does not emerge from a ground, 
origin, or operate within a dialectic of essence/appearance, but which consists of an 
economy of acoustic surfaces/timings/spatialities: diffuse, interpenetrative, and 
unclassifiable: a “sensual” logic. Traditional philosophies of language tend to flatten  
out and simplify the space/time/material relations of language, in favour of a stable, 
timeless, fixed identity, which makes logical thought possible, through fixed, linear, 
disciplinary forms. This paper seeks instead to extend and complicate categories of logic, 
to include doubt, paradox, infinity and “[un]disciplined” forms of understanding, as 
evidence of difference as the primary quality of language: a “mimetologic” as Lacoue-
Labarthe has termed it, formed of a wildly [un]disciplined set of (re-)marks and gestures.
In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze suggests that an understanding of 
difference might initially be conceived as occupying a midway position 
between two extremes. Indifference, is either an indeterminate field out  
of which nothing distinct arises: “the black nothingness, the indeterminate 
animal in which everything is dissolved”,1 in other words, an abyss. Or it is 
comprised of a series of disconnected, mutually indifferent elements, which 
appear in the “[W]hite nothingness, the once more calm surface upon which 
float unconnected determinations like scattered members.”2 Such fragmentary, 
mutually exclusive determinations are no less indifferent than the first version, 
since they lack overall coherence, each being a singular indifference. In either 
case, the problem for Deleuze is that difference is presented as a relation 
between elements, and its production relies upon the ability to draw sharp 
divisions between the constituent parts of previously undifferentiated fields, 
concepts, or elements, such that the figure is set in a determinate relation  
to a ground.3 This attitude, Deleuze suggests, invokes the allure of the deep 
cut, the either/or, the right/wrong, and the classical laws of thought as set out 
by Aristotle.4 This paper will argue that the simultaneity of reading and seeing, 
1. Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, translated by Paul Patton, (Continuum: London and 
New York, 2001), p. 28.
2. And further: “…a head without a neck, an arm without a shoulder, eyes without brows.” 
Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, Ibid. 
3. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 31–69.
4. Aristotelian logic is based on the following three Laws of Thought: The Principle of Identity 
(where A is A), the Principle of Contradiction, (where A cannot be both B and not B at the same time); 
and the Principle of the Excluded Middle (where A is located either on one side or the other side, but 
not in between A and B). In The Wisdom of Art, Barthes suggests that Twombly’s work is differently 
configured: “It is in a way another logic, a kind of challenge, on the part of the poet (and the painter) 
materia prima
sense 
gestures
immanence
difference. 
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of drawing as both trace and performance in Cy Twombly’s work, collapses  
the relationship between figure and ground, and does so in a way that 
acknowledges an immanent notion of difference.
For Deleuze, pure difference is not to be found in the distinction from 
something else, in the difference between two things, but in an immanent, 
intrinsic (singular, unilateral) differing within the object, thought, event, in 
itself; one which nonetheless persistently carries along with it, its relation to 
that from which it seeks individuation. This form of difference then becomes 
the new extreme in thought, since, rather than a difference in which the 
boundaries are observable, exterior to the object or concept under 
consideration, and satisfyingly (clearly) drawn, Deleuze suggests that true 
difference is a question of “determination as such”5 or difference in-itself:  
“[I]nstead of something distinguished from something else, imagine something 
that distinguishes itself–and yet that from which it distinguishes itself does 
not distinguish itself from it.”6
Difference conceived in this way, is the ability to be both distinguished 
from, but at the same time to stay with, that which foregrounds it, such that 
figure and ground are mutually implicated. He uses the following example: 
while lightening might take its distinguishing character from the black sky, 
that sky is simultaneously, and inextricably, part of what gives the lightening 
its form (and therefore its meaning). In such a relation: “It is as if the ground 
rose to be surface, without ceasing to be ground.”7 Figure and ground are as 
one; empirically interdependent, but consistently interrelated, without being 
posed in a hierarchy, or severing the figure from a ground conceived as an 
origin. The sky trails the lightening, while the lightening insistently seeks to 
be relieved of that relation, in a tight and tense interlocking and weaving of 
the different and the indifferent. In the same way, Twombly’s work is 
simultaneously a performance of the work, in which the process cannot be 
divorced from the outcome, and whose heterogeneity, or “excess” is always 
primary. Any satisfying unification of the disparate and dissolute, the sign  
to the Aristotelian rules of structure” pp. 107–108. 
5. Gilles Deleuze, Difference & Repetition, p. 28
6. Ibid. 
7. Deleuze, in quoting Artaud’s definition of cruelty, as “[n]othing but determination as such, 
that precise point at which the determined maintains its relation to the undetermined,” goes on 
to explain that such cruelty is the defining character of thinking itself. Here, Deleuze, in following 
Artaud, argues that thought maintains its precise and “unilateral” relation to the indeterminate. There 
is a cold, clinical dialectic at play in this withholding relation between the indeterminate and the de-
terminate; one fraught with tension and paradox, since “there is no sin other than raising the ground 
and dissolving the form.” This violence of distinction and form-giving is often named as reason itself, 
prompting Deleuze to concentrate on the “irrational” and “monstrous” as a way to seize productive 
difference. But see Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, pp. 28–40. See also Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, Vol 1 and Vol 2, (Minnesota: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1987).
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and the signified, under a final concept or representation, is withheld. Deleuze 
will call this experience a form of “cruelty” to thought, since the desired flight 
from the “elusive adversary” (the indifferent), can never fully take place.8  
In other words: the “deep cut” which establishes meaning as difference, is 
illusory. Difference is the refusal of the power of representation (based on 
identity, sameness, resemblance, or similarity) as a means of unproblematically 
engaging ideas/objects. “Difference,” explains Deleuze, “is not the difference 
between different forms, or the difference from some original model, 
difference is the power that over and over again produces new forms.9 As a 
producer of “new forms”, this Deleuzian form of difference offers instead an 
affirmative, immanent materiality, one which proliferates, and becomes 
productive. Being is understood, then, as a singular multiplicity, a unilateral 
distinction, not a distinction from, but a distinction with.10 Rather than a 
“without,” difference is “made” by the interpenetration of an autonomous 
ground rising to the surface, the form[s] which dissolve in it, and the 
movement of both, which collapses determinations and the indeterminate in  
a single move.11 
A similar move can be seen with repetition as mimesis, the non-imitative, 
non-communicable form of expression, both immanent to art and language, 
and one that finds its home there, similarly collapses binaric determinations, 
in a fluid movement and exchange between word and thing, subject and 
object, forfeiting the kind of clarity and sharp delineations necessary for 
rationality to flourish, by bringing ground, surface and form[s] into a non-
equivalent, pulsating relation. In rationality, real difference is cursed, made 
“monstrous”, if it forfeits a willing surrender to the determinate. Similarly, 
that which constitutes “common sense” can be understood as that which is 
taken as a given in thought; it consists of consciously (or otherwise) “agreed 
upon” terms of reference, which allow thought to conspire around 
unexamined, unproblematic concepts.12 In distinction to this move, and as  
8. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, Ibid. This “elusive adversary” is posed as the intimate, en-
twined, but ultimately paralysing relationship between the different and the indifferent, which cannot 
be undone. 
9. Claire Colebrook, Routledge Guide to Critical Thinkers: Gilles Deleuze, (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002) p. 123. 
10. Jean Luc Nancy, Being Singular Plural, translated by Robert Richardson and Anne O’Byrne, 
Meridian: Crossing Aesthetics, (Stanford: Stanford University, 2000), pp. 1–100.
11. See Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, where he writes, “Form distinguishes itself from mat-
ter, or the ground, but not the converse, since distinction is itself a form,” p. 28. 
12. Deleuze does not think of problems as there to be solved, but as ideas, which, unlike closed 
concepts, continue to proliferate and be productive. To be unproblematic, for Deleuze, is to deny the 
creative potential of thought. What is so “common” about common sense is that it relies upon specific 
analytic of judgment, one involving recognition, opposition, analogy and similarity (all mechanisms 
of the faculties). It recalls, rather than encounters an object of thought. Thinking, which for Deleuze 
can only be sensed rather than recognized (as in the form of a representation, grounded in identity-
thinking), and which implies immanent encounters and events, ends, where agreement and conceptual 
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the starting point for Deleuze’s philosophy of difference; we have what could 
be termed an “[un]common sense,” one that explodes the mythical “common” 
which orients sense in relation to the same (identity), rather than to difference. 
With this new orientation toward difference that Deleuze and Deleuze 
and Guattari suggest, a vital, urgent space for conceptualising real difference  
is established. Rather than presenting difference as a “not-belonging” (an 
outsider or other), it would make nonsense, paradox and “that which does not 
fit in” an attribute of, rather than a negation of, sense. Paradox would no 
longer be the insoluble, the unwelcome, the trivialized epiphenomenon, but 
evidence of real difference at work, and of multiple time[ing]s. 
The gestures/traces of language seen in the sensual surfaces of 
undifferentiated marks and sounds, would be meaningful, and “name” 
meaning differently. In [un]common sense, cruelty becomes productive, and 
the monstrous becomes a refusal of assimilation to a norm. Both escape the 
tyranny of representation and identity politics.13 In place of sharp 
determinations, difference founded on opposition, and a form of thinking 
grounded in identity and the same, one finds, indetermination, difference-in-
itself, intensity, and paradox, all of which are posed as a violently “discordant 
harmony”, which run counter to common sense, and in turn invoke the richly 
productive conflict between imagination and reason which drives the Kantian 
sublime.14 Thinking, as this form of difference, becomes a material intensity 
without being sutured to the symbolic; logic-sense that embraces rather than 
opposes nonsense and negation; posing them as freedom, not loss. Such 
intensity, while escaping the trap of representation in thought, simultaneously 
denies the power of grammar and logic as imprisonments of thought.15
The sign or point of departure for that which forces thought is thus 
the coexistence of contraries, the coexistence of more and less in an 
unlimited qualitative becoming. Recognition, by contrast, measures 
and limits the quality by relating it to something, thereby 
interrupting the mad-becoming.16
identification begins. Thought’s dynamic is tempered by the object of thought which has been tamed, 
de-intensified, reconciled via “a little bit of order” which takes us out of the pre-philosophical chaos, 
but halts thought, as it culminates in transcendence. 
13. Cf. Kant’s reference to the “prodigious” or “monstrous” as being at, or exceeding the limit 
of, the sublime as a pure (immanent) magnitude. He writes, “An object is monstrous if by its magni-
tude it nullifies the purpose that constitutes its concept.” Immanuel Kant, § 26,“On Estimating the 
Magnitude”, Critique of Judgment, translated by W. S. Pluhar, (New York: Hackett, 1987), pp. 109 and 
253, respectively. In this sense, the monstrous can be seen aggressively to exceed and consume its own 
concept, courting self-destruction. This form of the sublime violates the commonality of judgments by 
exceeding our powers of apprehension. 
14. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 146 
15. Colebrook, Deleuze, p. 14. 
16. Deleuze, Difference and Repetition, p. 141. 
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Paradox names or embodies such a “mad-becoming”. Contraries co-exist in,  
at, and upon the interruption of this “mad-becoming”. More and less are 
intertwined, and as a profound, radical simultaneity/contradiction, repetition 
and difference at one and the same time a paradox becomes the pure, 
unassimilable event; it features the “indissoluble something” which haunts  
the concept.17 In the opening pages of The Logic of Sense, Deleuze develops the 
argument , showing how, via Lewis Carroll’s “Alice stories,” the paradox as 
“pure event” is revealed through the materiality of language. In the statement: 
“Alice becomes larger,” the familiar linear time/space relations in language 
give way to an ever-deferred present, characterized by an essential simultaneity, 
involving two or more things happening at the same time. In this case, both 
larger and smaller in/at the same instant; pulling in/at both directions at 
once; unfixable, mobile in any present. Alice is both smaller and larger at the 
same time by virtue of a paradoxical fabric of language whereby in the instant 
of saying “Alice becomes larger,” she is by necessity both larger than she  
was, but at the same time smaller than she will be. Language as “becoming”  
is irreconcilable with fixity, permanence and identity: its requirement is 
multivalent time[s]. 
The pure event, is one in which sense, speed, dimension, intensity,  
and direction are available at any given moment. Moving away from the 
rigidity and a-temporality on the part of identity-thinking, that have for  
so long thwarted conceptual suppleness, forces us to reconsider notions of 
permanence, fixed qualities, chronology [time/temporality] and the “present 
tense” of language upon which numerous accounts of meaning are founded. 
Bergson puts it like this: 
The real, the experienced, and the concrete are recognized by the 
fact that they are variability itself; the element by the fact that it  
is invariable. And the element is invariable by definition, being a 
diagram, a simplified reconstruction, often a mere symbol, in any 
case a motionless view of the moving reality.18 
17. A point that echoes (though in quite a different manner) throughout Adorno’s Negative 
Dialectics. For Adorno, The “indissoluble something” is the non-identical aspect of any concept, which 
cannot be absorbed into the concept nor represented by it, but nevertheless persists. Its incompos-
sibility and indispensability brings forth truth. The collision of concept and object always leaves a 
remainder, which thought cannot erase by any effort. When the concept of paradox meets its object, 
a “something” is released which is irreducible to the concept. As we will see shortly, we move from 
Adorno’s “non-identical” to Twombly’s dissolute graphemes: his undisciplined gestures. But see  
Theodor Adorno, “The Indissoluble Something,” Negative Dialectics, pp. 135–136.
18. Henri Bergson, An Introduction to Metaphysics (1903), (New York: Hackett Publishing,  
1999). p. 42. 
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It is at this point that we return to Cy Twombly’s work. Neither founded on 
invariable symbolic elements nor attempting to reconstruct the diagram (or 
any other entity) as something that lies beyond itself, Twombly refuses any 
form of pointing, proposing, or designating. Its grammar is non-indicative;  
its form non-denotational. In its inhabitation of matter as meaning[full]-in-
itself, and its refusal to hold the figural to its promise of an uncomplicated 
and distinct relation to the ground, Twombly’s work acknowledges the 
potential in Deleuze’s claim that representational thinking based on the 
identical, the similar, the analogous, universal, oppositional and contradictory 
(thesis/anti-thesis; this/not-this and so on) is too limited; it cannot provide a 
space for real difference to emerge. In denying the inevitability of sameness or 
recognition, as a way to make meaning, it celebrates divergence, disparateness, 
and the dissimilar.19 Twombly’s work exemplifies the power of negative  
as affirmation, not erasure; of the mobile, transitory, and un-nameable 
contradictory impulses and drives of thought; of movement and becoming  
in place of abstract concepts; of immanence, mutability; of the infinite nature 
and instability of paradox, which coalesces in an [un]common sense, and  
a making sense of the uncommon. 
For Benjamin, thought necessarily involves the discontinuous 
presentation of “fragments of thoughts”, set in an interruptive relationship  
of infinite detours. Coherence is to be found in the “flashes” and gaps in  
and between perceptible knowledge, rather than in the coherent sequencing  
of ideas or in the relatively uncomplicated collision of ideas and their 
presentation. Dissolution and dissonance, rather than denotation; 
heterophony rather than homophony; elision rather than elucidation – all 
bring meaning [truth, sense] into view.20 To put this slightly differently: ideas 
may precede presentation, but the materializing of meaning, of truth, can only 
be sought in the interstices, the oblique, the constellatory.21 In this way, the 
19. Barthes, The Wisdom of Art, op. cite. 
20. Heterophony, a term originally found in Plato, is a form of music in which a single melodic 
line is the point of departure for simultaneous and overlapping variants, played at different rhythms, 
frequently at odds with conventional harmonic structure, and creating its own intricate dissonant 
textures. It can be found in many non-western forms of music. But see Plato, “Book II,” in his Laws, 
translated by Benjamin Jowitt (The Project Gutenberg Ebook of Laws by Plato), last updated Jan 15, 
2013 at http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1750/1750-h/1750-h.htm. 
21. Originally developed by Adorno in his Aesthetic Theory, “constellation” was developed by 
Benjamin to name montage, fragmentary, disjunctive, often temporally unrelated configurations, 
which nevertheless produce meaning by allowing unseen correspondences to emerge instantaneously. 
Most famously developed in his The Arcades Project, (New York: Belknapp Press, 2002). This meth-
odological preference shares the original affinity with Adorno’s notion of constellation, developed 
by Adorno as the process that unlocks the “specific side of the object”, and, in so doing, exceeds con-
ceptual categories. For Adorno, “constellation” named, amongst other things, the political economy 
of advanced capitalism. See Theodor Adorno, “Constellation,” Negative Dialectics, translated by E. B. 
Ashton, (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 162 and developed in detail in his Aesthetic Theory, (New York: 
Continuum Press, 2004), especially in “Situation,” “Semblance and Expression,” and “Towards a 
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mimetic faculty allows us to perceive what Benjamin calls nonsensuous 
(nonsensible) similarities, where the ordered surface[s] of language, which 
ordinarily conceal and subordinate the multiplicity of relationships of 
similarity within language, are abruptly broken, such that: “something similar 
can become apparent instantaneously, in a flash.”22 These types of 
discontinuous assemblages which Barthes, referring to the spatial qualities  
of Twombly’s work, calls “rare” (from the Latin for gaps or interstices, sparse, 
porous, scattered), are not a subordinate form of understanding, but make 
meaning precisely an [un]common sense.23 
Cy Twombly’s work not only makes matter materialise; it makes matter 
matter. In place of concepts, which inhibit thought’s intensity, permits ideas 
and problems to proliferate, without suffering the fatal closure of 
representation, it proposes an “event” of mark-making without determination, 
as an exemplification of non-representational thought, and a paradoxical, 
plural performance of materia prima [raw material] as stubborn indeterminacy 
and refusal to submit to a closure which proliferates a form of unproductive 
cruelty.24 In its indifference to the harsh division of meaning (being 
immanently and obstinately in-difference), Twombly’s work wildly materialises 
sense in all its provocatively undisciplined slices, gestures and immanent 
differentiations. Benjamin’s proposal, that art “is always a question of, and 
questioning of, understanding” becomes, for Twombly – and for us – the 
embodiment and proliferation of such [un]disciplined gestures, which in turn 
form an [un]common sense.25
Theory of the Artwork,” pp. 16–44, 100–117, 175–198, respectively.
22. Developed in 1933 as part of the general discussion on mimesis, see Walter Benjamin, The 
Doctrine of the Similar, (1933) originally in Benjamin, Gesammelte Schriften, edited by Rolf Tidemann and 
Hermann Schweppenhauser, Vol II, (Franfurt: Frankfurt au Main, 1977), pp. 204–210 and reproduced 
with permission at http://www.jstor.org/discover/10.2307/488010?uid=3738032&uid=2&uid=4&s
id=21102817560141 
23. Barthes, The Art of Wisdom, p. 105. 
24. Cruelty, for both Deleuze, and Artaud, is a productive force, in its creation of a dynamic 
tension, and an aesthetic. Cruelty pushes thought to its limit, gives it definition, while simultaneously 
(paradoxically), enacting the deep-cut of meaning. However, in another reading of Deleuze (Differ-
ence and Repetition, p.28), determinations, and fixed points of reference, are conceits of the intellect, 
which restrain and limit thought. In other words: they are a cruelty within thought, and do it harm. In 
contrast, Deleuze also proposes that language is not representation, or comprised of a series of fixed, 
static points, but pure becoming. Concepts cannot fix ideas, since ideas will always expand beyond the 
boundaries that seek to contain them, and are thus simplified and restrictive in comparison. 
25. Carol Jacobs, “Letters From Walter Benjamin,” in her In The Language of Walter Benjamin, 
(Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins, 1999), p.1. On the question of gesture and its paradox as 
“outside” and “dirtying” the logic of representation and semiotics, see for example an early discussion 
by Barthes, where he writes: “[T]hese gestures, which aim to establish matter as fact, are all associated 
with making something dirty. Here is a paradox: a fact is more purely defined if it is not clean. Take a 
common object: it is not its new and virgin state which best accounts for its essence; it is rather a state 
in which it is deformed, a little worn, a little dirtied, a little forlorn: the truth of things is best read in 
refuse. It is in a smear that we find the truth of redness; it is in a wobbly line that we find the truth 
of pencil. Ideas (in the Platonic sense of the word) are not metallic and shiny Figures, in conceptual 
corsets, but rather faint shaky stains, on a vague background.” Barthes, The Wisdom of Art, p. 104. 
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